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In 2005, Helios flight 522 crashed into a Greek hillside. Was it because one man forgot to flip a switch?
Early on the morning of 14 August 2005, Alan Irwin, then 44, was with his partner, Donna, and their two young children in an apartment in Larnaca, Cyprus. It was a convenient base, only minutes from the airport. Irwin was an aircraft engineer; he had become obsessed with the technical aspects of planes as a young man in the Royal Air Force, following in the footsteps of his father, also an aircraft engineer and pilot. “I enjoy being around machines,” Irwin says. “If they’re broken, they’re… (www.theguardian.com) עוד...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Every standard cockpit geographical check generally starts from the left seat over to the right seat and then down the centre console. At some point on an originating flight the first officer should have completed a manual/auto check of the pressurization outflow valve for proper indication and operation and at the end of the check the system would have been returned to auto and confirmed on the prestart checklist, again on the take-off checklist, again on the after take-off checklist (confirming the aircraft is pressurizing) and again while completing the 10,000’ and above checklist. If the engineer left the auto/manual switch in Manual it would mean the crew failed to do their required checks. If however, the first officer was interrupted while doing this check, he/she could have failed to finish the procedure by confirming the system was back in auto. Since two items can set off the same audio warning, one must eliminate the takeoff configuration warning because they are airborne, the other requires a glance up and a quick flick while reaching for the O2 mask. It’s called a type rating for a reason.
Did they not check the CVR or the DFDR? surely that would have shown whether or not they followed the checklist and confirmed the switch was set to auto. I agree with Highflyer1950, it is the ultimate responsibility of the flight crew to confirm that systems are nominal and correctly functioning.
My experience of over 16,000 hrs on DC9's tells me that sometimes a crew member will try to shortcut checklists. NOT ON MY WATCH!
My experience of over 16,000 hrs on DC9's tells me that sometimes a crew member will try to shortcut checklists. NOT ON MY WATCH!
This was an older CVR that only recorded for 30 minutes, so it only caught the last portion of the flight right before it crashed. So my guess is the FDR didn't rec many parameters such as switch positions.
Obviously I can't speak for Helios in 2005, but our Before Start Checklist includes checking the press switch is set correctly (it may not be AUTO if there is an MEL item).
Even in this day and age it is common for the pilot responding to the checklist challenge to state the correct response without actually looking at the item in question. It was hammered into us pretty hard in initial training that when running a checklist the person reading needs to verify the response as well, not just the person responding.
Obviously I can't speak for Helios in 2005, but our Before Start Checklist includes checking the press switch is set correctly (it may not be AUTO if there is an MEL item).
Even in this day and age it is common for the pilot responding to the checklist challenge to state the correct response without actually looking at the item in question. It was hammered into us pretty hard in initial training that when running a checklist the person reading needs to verify the response as well, not just the person responding.
The question you need to ask yourself is "Why are crew members shortcutting checklists?". Rather than blaming the person i.e. "NOT ON MY WATCH!", have a look at your HSMS.
When operating between 4 & 6 legs a day, crews eventually commit to memory checklist items. To me, the most intensive checklist is the “originating” checklist which should catch the most serious issues? Quick turn checks tend to get run very quickly but as I stated earlier the crew had a minimum of 5 opportunities to catch a switch in the wrong position and 3 chances to observe that the aircraft was not pressurizing during the climb? You might remember the Payne Stewart accident where there was a great deal of certainty that the O2 bottle may have not been turned on during the pre-flight which would have rendered O2 masks useless depriving the crew/passengers of O2. Sadly, we are all human and do make mistakes.
I am dumbfounded how any reasonable person can find a party on the ground at fault for any incident short of a blatant attempt to carry out an act that is intended to interfere with the safety of flight. But, that can only apply to any control input that is not within reach or has an indicator provided to the flight crew.
So, that leaves one cause... failure to follow procedures and verify with the checklists from pre-start on forward.
This would not be the first time an incident took place because of checklist and procedural failure. Though they are much more rare there will likely be others regardless of how "safe" an airplane is designed and how "idiot proof" the engineers may try to make them.
The very last line of defense against any incident is... the human factor.
And, there is an issue when management places so much pressure upon the flight crew they are less likely to return when an issue appears in flight that cannot be resolved. Two things should always be the first option... to go around and after departure, put it back on the ground.
So, that leaves one cause... failure to follow procedures and verify with the checklists from pre-start on forward.
This would not be the first time an incident took place because of checklist and procedural failure. Though they are much more rare there will likely be others regardless of how "safe" an airplane is designed and how "idiot proof" the engineers may try to make them.
The very last line of defense against any incident is... the human factor.
And, there is an issue when management places so much pressure upon the flight crew they are less likely to return when an issue appears in flight that cannot be resolved. Two things should always be the first option... to go around and after departure, put it back on the ground.