FAA identifies new potential risk on 737 MAX

No..no way should an aircraft manufacture be allowed to basically sign it's own air worthiness certificate...simple fact is if not enough folks are around to do all certificates in a timely manner...you wait!

So Boeing and its fellow capitalists use their economic muscle to pressure Congress to not only limit funding of the FAA etc but also push for "less government regulations" and trust the free market, elect people who are in their pocket, etc. etc...... And when it all goes wrong, as it has here, it is "the Government's" fault.

So Boeing, who deliberately hid what they were doing from the FAA, misrepresented the MCAS system etc. is not to blame but rather the blame belongs to the body that was repeatedly lied to. Sounds logical to me.

Until corporate execs face serious personal jeopardy they will feel free to create an environment where the only measure of success is the value of their stock options, which is a short term view. We have seen this scenario play out repeatedly in various industries, not just here with Boeing.

Once corporate headquarters were moved from where the planes were being built and designed this sort of outcome was almost enevitable. Senior management needs to keep its ear the the ground.....but it does no good if the ear to the ground is in Chicago not Washington State.

People get the government they pay for.

...wow,thanks.....

What if the airline decides to serve the hot or high airport at some point after the sale? What then?

Not for nothing, but 12 years ago, the first B787 came up here to Sacramento for hot weather testing. In fact, it flew in and out of MHR for 4 days. Coincidentally, we hit over 100 degrees for 3 weeks surrounding their test flights.

So it isn't as if Boeing can claim that the MAX couldn't be flown out of hot or high airports, when they did their test flights for B787 certification out of a hot airport.

It is a misnomer to say the aircraft has a design flaw. It is simply a different aircraft that tor training purposes they want it to fly like previous aircraft. An analogy would be taking your 250hp mustang and designing the same car with 500hp. You can no longer punch the throttle in a turn and expect the rear end to stay behind the direction of travel. It will take software to control traction, suspension, and throttle to make it act like the previous model.

I don't think it's so much talking about training/experience and the fact that, yes, automation is taking over far too much. It is some folks insinuation " Neither of those MAX accident aircraft were unflyable if Memory Items in the FCOM Runaway Stabilizer checklist had been completed." 2 fully trained MAX pilots took the Ethiopian flight in a simulator, followed through with memory checklist, and results were not good. BTW, according to logs/data etc, the Ethiopian crew did follow the memory checklist.

Boeing builds what its customers want and what they buy. If the airlines don't/won't buy something else, there's no reason for Boeing (or Airbus or anyone else) to build something different.

Airlines make more money by stuffing in more people and maximising the use of the cabin space. If you want a chuckle, look back at the early proposals for lounges, restaurants, casinos, and shops on board 747s and A380s. The idea that an airline would take revenue-producing space out of use like that is pretty funny these days.

The cost of designing, producing AND convincing airlines heavily invested in 737s to buy a six-inch wider aircraft just because people are fat simply won't happen.

Umm... this isn't true.

The Boeing 7E7 was announced and designed in 2003, was rebranded the B787 in 2005, first test flight in 2007, went into production in 2009. 6 years from CAD to first commercial flight.

Now with that said, Boeing shot themselves in the foot with the KC46 and the B38M/B39M, so that's on them. But to say that it will take a long time to certify an aircraft isn't true.

Thanks Rapidwolve,

I feel this a/c needs to be completely certified as there are very different features to prior 737 models.

For example I am interested in the relatively elevated position of the engines located partially within the airflow pattern into the leading edge (when compared with other certified 737s). In the event of an uncontained catastrophic compressor failure, what is the potential for blade shrapnel or hub debris to destroy a significant section of the leading edge to the extent that there is a grossly asymmetric lift mismatch leading to an uncontrollable roll moment, especially if this were to occur at a high power setting, eg post Vr at takeoff, or in a go-around initiation ?

There were two other factors I did not detail regarding the Ethiopian crash:

1. The throttles were advanced to give power to climb, which the a/c would have been doing if MCAS was not trimming nose down. Because of the MCAS imposed nose down trim, the power was converted to airspeed rather than altitude. If the pilots had been able to get the nose up they would have gained altitude and reduced airspeed.

2. The a/c was only about 1,000 feet agl, which is almost nothing for a 737 flying into rising terrain. If the pilots had cut power (to bring down the airspeed to reduce the load on the elevator trim to a point they could manually overcome this load) the nose would have fallen and, at their airspeed, they would have lost the 1,000 feet rapidly.

Their only hope might have been to continue flying with MCAS/electric trim switched off hoping that they could very gradually, slowly reduce the throttles and using all their strength to keep the nose on or above the horizon, hope that ground effect would keep them just sufficiently aloft to clear any obstacles until they could get the airspeed down to a level that they could manually trim. Any attempt to turn would probably have been fatal as would any sudden terrain change.

But they only had seconds to figure it out.