Capt Sullenberger lessons from AF447

Well theres no question... a stick shaker would've saved them all.
Sorry this is A VERY BIG problem for Airbus, no way around it.
But who lets the low time pilot take command when you've lost all your
pitot tubes, flying in a storm, and without the auto pilot???
Sorry the real blame goes to the senior co-pilot in the left seat, for not assuming command, and the failure of ANY real CRM skills,.. . never even discissing the reason for the stall horn... the Airbus auto trim also comes into question.. once he set the attitude it was over. THE aircraft itself, the Pilots, and failure to communciate,... in that Order,

No! just the comment that currently a Yoke can be the difference in arriving alive,
and this situation proves what Airbus did not do ...by simple engineering. And that's NO YOKE ..

Sometimes NEW is not better, and for me this proves why Boeing is still the leader no matterwhat the Volume of sales, and why they still produce aircarft without side sticks. I've flown on most Airbus Aircarft and prefer the comfort of the 320-321 over most Boeing single aile aircraft. But over the long haul Id rather trust my life in a 57 - 87

If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going.....

Unfortunately, as usual, it was a number of things that contributed. Most ALs train pilots to power out of an approaching stall. You can guarantee a failed check ride if you actually let the stall develop. There needs to be more actual stall awareness in the training cycle. From the transcript, it seems the PF never thought they were in a stall even with all the instruments and horns to the contrary. What if the incident had happened in daylight conditions? Even a casual look out would have helped the PF get a handle on things.
Under most normal operating conditions, the AB is an easier plane to 'fly' It is those rare, but not impossible, situations where the Boeing flight control philosophy is geared toward letting the plane and pilot communicate. Can you imagine what AF447's captain would have said immediately upon entering the cockpit if he had spotted the PF with a yoke back in his lap? The first rule is always "Fly the Plane" not "Manage the Flight Computer under Alternate Law."
Still, its easy to monday-morning-qb. RIP to those guys and all the pax.
Hopefully, and it looks like it is the case, all will learn from this tragedy and apply the hard lessons.

What happened to Airbus being able to take control of the plane with the computers to save it.... That is what took the plane down at a France Airshow... Computer commanded opposite of the captain.

What if it was struck by lightning and it totally threw off the digital readouts, and they were frozen on totally wrong info? They did mention saint elmos fire and a burning smell in the cockpit in the CVR transcript. Who knows? It could have said the nose is pitched down when it wasn't? I know there are backup steam gauges usually but who knows? Computers do wacky things when they are compromised by some outside influence.. as we all know.

There is no substitute for knowing how to fly. To really know how to fly. I believe that Bonin did not know how to fly. To really fly. He was trained in the operation of operating an aircraft, but that is very different. 75 stall warnings and he did not make the connection that the A/C was in a nose up condition, put in that attitude by use of the sidestick? He also didn't understand the real function of aircraft trim. Clearly a most unfortunate and preventable accident. And the failure of the more senior flight officer not taking command. Cockpit management? Where was that?

Hey, I can dream can't I? Haha

Anniversary observance. No new ground. Are we going to see another 100-200 comment BA vs AB religious battle again?

Specializing Pitot Static systems and have done so for over 29 years now myself and others knew from the beginning that this was not a Pitot Static Failure... Where was his standby instruments, DME, IRS readouts that give ground speed. These guys simply lost situational awareness, As Sulley stated with the sticks, they need to be linked. Not being linked can be a very big problem, and one reason I never liked this technology. Both crew members should be able to tell what the other one is doing without looking at the other crew members joy stick.

Well, still not really explained(pilot action) but linked sidesticks apparently would have solved the problem, at least of keeping the AC flying and in looking at that diagnosis, although speed tubes went out and caused the AP to drop off, apparently the stall warning was valid, unlike what some have thought, but it still appears that there was loss of situational awareness in the cockpit, by both pilots.

Quit speculating! We all know it was sabotaged by Bush.

I have to chime in here on this BA/AB debate. Both are great aircraft and computers are all over them. The newest military aircraft are fly-by-wire. The F-16 is an OLD aircraft now and it is totally FBW. Not wanting to get into the sidestick and how it functions, I want to point out the fact that the relief captain held the nose up, ignoring 75 stall warnings and he was really the cause of the accident. You only have to review the FAA video of Colgan 3407 at KBUF to understand that airlines train to never loose more than 100 feet during stall recovery. The outcome in this tragic case was the same---CFIT. However, the crews need to understand that you always have to lower the angle of attack first. Sometimes you will have to do this only 500 feet AGL. The airplane will not fly if beyond the critical angle of attack. Get the wing flying, add full power and you break the stall. If you already have full power (TOGA in the case of AF) you need to lower the pitch and get the wings flying again. He and the Colgan captain, somewhere along the line, never learned this. Colgan had about 800 feet. AF had 30,000 feet. What in hell was he holding the nose up at that altitude? I have to admit, I wasn't there. I don't know the implications of the weather. There must have been lots of panic and poor decision making. Let's learn.

It's unclear to me why Sullenberger focuses on the stick but doesn't even mention the attitude indicator (electronic or stand-by). Irrespective of whether the pitot tubes were operable, how could both pilots not have noticed that the aircraft was pitching up. Also, wasn't this aircraft equipped with an angle of attack indicator and, if so, that would provide the certainty that the reason for the descent was a stall. Finally, it's remarkable to me that AF447 apparently didn't spin, even when the crew completely mismanaged the problem. If anything, that is a tribute to the Airbus design.

Never say never. But it’s a simple fact that no commercial airliner will fly at cruising altitude with a pitch of more than 5° up.
2.5° pitch up and 95% thrust will cover your ass until you investigate further…

Stall warning off with decreasing airspeed/increasing pitch, on with increasing airspeed/decreasing pitch.That's the answer.
It would be confusing to any pilot who didn't understand that about how the Airbus is programmed.

Once again...if it don't say Boeing, I ain't going. I miss my 767-300ER.

AOA indicators on all airplanes..

Really Sully? I suppose now you'd rather have flown a 737-700 into the Hudson, instead of the A320-214 - assuming the Boeing would have made it and floated.

This again?

It was an incredibly stupid pilot error that should have never happen and reinforces what I've always said and taught my own students... accidents from pilot error always happen because the pilot does something stupid.

Just goes on to prove that the most dangerous component of any airplane is the moron at the flight controls.

Someone shut Sully up! I had to put up with his ego in a recurrent once. Once, seemed like an eternity.